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'RECENT CASE NOTES
importance of this distinction in view of the fact that, in either case, the mort-
gagor's possession is rightful.
The closer question arises where there is a mere retention of possession of
the mortgaged property with permission for its use by the mortgagor, without
additional facts from which consent can be implied.1 8 Some cases have held
the deciding factor to be whether or not the repairs were reasonably necessary
for the continued use of the mortgaged property.' 9 But these facts alone, even
where the nature of the property is such that its use will obviously necessitate
repairs, should not be held to support a finding of implied consent, for such
would lead, in any event, to the unreasonable result of allowing the mortgage
security to be impaired by a use in which the mortgagee has no interest.
The lack of harmony in the cases involving this question makes apparent
that there are strong reasons in policy favoring either side.2 0 But it would
seem that cases giving priority to the subsequent mechanic's lien on such inade-
quate grounds have ignored the purpose of the recording statutes. Because of
the helpless position of the mortgagee with respect to mortgaged property
retained in the possession of the mortgagor, as is the usual custom, and of the
facilities afforded by the record whereby the repairman can protect himself, it
appears reasonable to place the burden on the repairman to discover if property
delivered to him is encumbered. If such should be the case, he may proceed on
the personal credit of the mortgagor, or secure the mortgagee's express consent
that the mortgage lien be subordinated. A bona fide purchaser from the mort-
gagor would be unprotected 2 l and it is questionable whether a repairman
should receive more protection.
In view of the extensive use of chattel mortgages at the present time in
financing purchases of automobiles it appears important to protect the security
of the mortgage transaction as much as possible. It is submitted that, in the
light of the recording statute, the principal case is a justifiable limitation on
the doctrine of implied consent as an exception to the general rule that a lien
prior in time is prior in right. C. D. S.
CORPORATIONS--PREFERRED STOCKHOLDER'S Surr TO COMPEL DECLARATION OF
DrvIDENvs.Stockholder brought an action to recover dividends accrued on
cumulative preferred stock. The corporation was completely dominated by its
president, who alone opposed this suit. The other two directors were not made
defendants. The court rendered judgment for the amount of the delinquent
dividends and decreed a contingent payment of dividends so long as the
corporation is possessed of surplus or earnings in profits from which to pay
18 Mortgagee protected: Shaw v. Webb (1915), 131 Tenn. 173, 174 S. W.
273, L. R. A. 1915D, 1141. Artisan protected: Guaranty Security Corporation
v. Brophy (1923), 243 Mass. 597, 137 N. E. 751.
19 Atlas Securities Co. v. Grove (1922), 79 Ind. App. 144, 137 N. E. 570;
Bowen v. Kokomo Omnibus Co. (1927), 87 Ind. App. 245, 161 N. E. 298; Moor-
head Motor Co. v. H. D. Walker Auto Co. (1923), 133 Miss. 63, 97 So. 486.
Cf. Broom v. Dale (1815), 109 Miss. 52, 67 So. 659, L. R. A. 1915D, 1146;
Myers v. Neely and Ensor Auto Co. (1923), 143 Md. 107, 121 Ati. 916.
20 Further evidence of the conflict in policy is shown by the variety of treat-
ment which the problem has received in state statutes on the subject. See
I Jones, LIENS (3rd ed. 1914), secs. 749 to 786c.
21 Liver v. Mills (1909), 155 Cal. 459, 101 Pac. 299.
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dividends without impairment of its capital. Held, modified and affirmed. A
court of equity may order dividends paid out of earnings on preferred stock
when the officials of the corporation have acted in bad faith. It was error for
the lower court to order payment of dividends in the future. O'Neall q. O'Neall
(1940, Ind. App.), 25 N. E. (2d) 656.
The right of the preferred stockholder to dividends is generally interpreted
not as a common stockholder's right to share in profits but as a right arising
out of, and enforcible on, the theory of contract.1 The Indiana courts may not
be in accord with this interpretation, as they have consistently declared that the
preferred stockholder "is entitled to all the rights of the common stockholder,
except as modified by statute and contract.2 However, this contractual right of
the preferred stockholder confers on him no legal right to a division of profits
until a dividend has been made or declared.3 He is not a creditor of the
corporation but a stockholder. 4 This is true even though the dividends are
said to be "guaranteed" by the corporation. 5 The preferred stockholder is not
left without any protection, as his rights are enforcible in equity in accordance
with the terms of the contract securing the preference.6
In addition to the contractual limitations imposed upon the preferred stock-
holder's right to dividends, the courts adhere strictly to the general rule that
1 Spear v. Rockland-Rockport Lime Co. (1915), 113 Me. 285, 93 Ad. 754-,
6 A. L. R. 793; Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (1932), see. 5443. The con-
tract may be evidenced by statute, article, by-law, or, most usually, by the stock
certificate. On the general subject of this note see: 6 A. L. R. 793; 67 A. L. R.
780; 98 A. L. R. 1526.
2 Star Publishing Co. v. Ball (1922), 192 Ind. 158, 134 N. E. 285; Cring v.
Sheller Wood Rim Mfg. Co. (1933), 98 Ind. App. 310, 183 N. E. 674; Grover v.
Cavanaugh (1907), 40 Ind. App. 340, 82 N. E. 104-. This is particularly
important in determining whether the preferred stock is participating. If the
preferred stock has all the rights of the common and in addition the right of
preference, it would follow that the preferred stock is participating unless other-
wise provided. This is a minority view held chiefly by the Pennsylvania courts.
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. (1906), 215 Pa. 610, 64- At. 829.
See (1925-26), 11 Cornell L. Q. 230. No Indiana cases have been found on this
question.
3 Fricke v. Angemeier (1912), 53 Ind. App. 140, 101 N. E. 329. After the
dividend has been declared, the corporation becomes indebted to each share-
holder for the amount of his share and the stockholder may recover it in an
action at law against the corporation. Lee v. Fisk (1915), 222 Mass. 418, 109
N. E. 833; Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (1932), sec. 5451.
4 Cring v. Sheller Wood Rim Mfg. Co. (1933), 98 Ind. App. 310, 183 N. E.
674.
5 The guaranty is interpreted by the courts to be limited by the rule that
dividends can only be declared out of profits. Taft v. Hartford, etc., R. R.
(1886), 8 R. I. 310; Field v. Lamson & Goodnow Mfg. Co. (1894), 162 Mass.
388, 38 N. E. 1126, 27 L. R. A. 136. The guaranty may have the effect of
making the right to dividends cumulative. Austin v. Wright (1930), 156 Wash.
24, 286 Pac. 48; Boardman v. Lake Shore Ry. (1881), 84 N. Y. 157.
In Allied Magnet Wire Corp. v. Tuttle (1926), 199 Ind. 166, 154 N. E. 480,
50 A. L. R. 252 (rehearing denied, 199 Ind. 177, 156 N. E. 558), the contract
provided on failure to pay any dividend for ninety days that the preferred
stock would mature and be redeemed at the option of the holder. The court
refused appointment of a receiver and interpreted the contract to mean that
dividends were payable only if proper funds were available.
6 Thompson, Rights and Remedies of Preferred Stockholders (1893), 37
Central Law Journal 433.
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dividends are payable only out of surplus profits or net earnings; or stated
conversely, that dividends may not be declared out of capital.7 The courts use
these terms interchangeably and are disinclined to analyze financial structures
carefully. This limitation is used very effectively against the stockholder in his
suit to compel declaration of a dividend, as the burden is upon him to establish
proper funds.8
But once having established his right according to these first two considera-
tions, the preferred stockholder in his action to compel a declaration of dividends
is ultimately met with the general rule that the directors of a corporation are
the sole judges as to the propriety of declaring dividends and the courts will not
interfere with the proper exercise of that discretion.9 Such a principle is
sufficiently elastic to comprehend every situation. But the question, obscured by
this generality, is whether a different construction of the rule applies to different
classes of stock. No case has been found which distinguished between two
classes of stock in the same action. The majority of the courts declare the
general rule to be applicable to both preferred and common stock and then
apply the rule to the particular facts without distinguishing a different standard
of conduct for different classes of stock.1o It would seem that the preferred
stockholder is entitled to a greater protection than the common stockholder."1
Otherwise the corporation might indefinitely postpone payment of dividends in
an honest policy of expansion which would work for the benefit of the common
stockholder at the risk of the preferred stockholder. This result is possible
where the courts hold the contract of preference to mean only that the corpora-
tion must pay dividends to the preferred stock before any dividends can be
paid to the common stock. 1 2
The problem is raised more acutely in the case of non-cumulative preferred
stock. The United States Supreme Court has held that if dividends on non-
7Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (1932), sec. 544; Cring v. Sheller
(1933), 98 Ind. App. 310, 183 N. E. 674. This is true even in absence of con-
tract. Allied Magnet Wire Corp. v. Tuttle (1926), 199 Ind. 166, 154 N. E. 480,
50 A. L. R. 252.
The Indiana statutory provision is Burns' (1933), 25-211 (4833): "Divi-
dends.-The directors of every corporation shall have power, subject to any
restrictions contained in the articles of incorporation, to declare and pay divi-
dends upon the shares of capital stock, out of surplus earnings or net profits or
surplus paid in in cash of the corporation." The last feature, paid in in cash,
is unique and has not been interpreted. It might be used to prohibit payment
of dividends from paid-in surplus arising from reduction of capital stock or
purchase of corporate assets; or the statute might be used to insure the validity
of payment of dividends from premiums paid on an original issue. See Weiner
and Bonbright, Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Law; Surplus and Profits
(1930), 30 Col. L. R. 330.
A Cring v. Sheller Wood Rim Mfg. Co. (1933), 98 Ind. App. 310, 183 N. E.
674.
9 Star Publishing Co. v. Ball (1922), 192 Ind. 158, 134 N. E. 285.
10 Hastings v. International Paper (1919), 187 App. Div. 404, 175 N. Y. S.
815.
11 Cratty v. Peoria Law Library Assn. (1906), 219 Ill. 516, 76 N. E. 707.
The court declared that a court of equity may aid a holder of preferred stock
where it would not aid a holder of common. See also: Inscho v. Mid-Continent
Dev. Co. (1915), 94 Kan. 370, 146 Pac. 1014, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 546.
12 Spear v. Rockland-Rockport Lime Co. (1915), 113 Me. 285, 93 Ad. 754,
6 A. L. R. 793.
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cumulative preferred stock are passed in the proper discretion of the board of
directors, though there are proper funds available, the claim for that year
cannot subsequently be asserted.' 3 Thus directors may accumulate a fund at
the expense of the non-cumulative preferred stockholders which may be dis-
tributed in a subsequent year to the common stockholders after payment of only
a single year's dividend to the preferred.' 4
Proper exercise of discretion is a phrase of convenient elasticity. Courts
have found an abuse of discretion to mean fraud, bad faith, oppression, or
merely arbitrary or unjustifiable conduct.1 5 It is not contended that the courts
should compel a declaration of dividends as a matter of right where there are
proper funds available. The internal management of a corporation is not
within the province of the courts. A few corporations have contracted away
the discretion of the board of directors and made dividends a matter of right
if proper funds are available,16 but such contracts are subject to the court's
refusal to so interpret them.17 Since the board of directors is in most instances
controlled by the common stockholders, it is submitted that the courts should
show a greater willingness to interfere in this type of suit and examine closely
the exercise of discretion by the board of directors in order to insure a more
adequate protection of the preferred stockholder's right to dividends.
The principal case seems entirely sound. The complete domination of the
board of directors by the president, the absence of directors' meetings except
for organization purposes, and the president's attempt to purchase the plaintiff's
stock with the corporate assets seem quite sufficient to support a finding that the
board of directors acted in bad faith and oppressively. The failure to join
directors as defendants in this type of suit occasionally has been held objection-
13 Wabash Ry. v. Barclay (1930), 280 U. S. 197, following N. Y. etc. Ry. v.
Nivkals (1886), 119 U. S. 296. The holding of the Wabash Ry. case definitely
rejects any theory of safeguarding non-cumulative stockholders by implying a
credit each year from profits available which may be required to be paid at any
time in the future. See Berle, Non-Cumulativre Preferred Stock (1923), 23 Col.
L R. 358. The Wabash Ry. case holds merely that no claim can be made for
dividends once passed and does not prohibit the board of directors from
declaring dividends for the lapsed periods if they so desire. This situation is
unlikely, as common stockholders usually control the corporation. Collins v.
Portland Electric Power Co. (1925), 7 F. (2d) 221, affd. 12 F. (2d) 671, 48
A. L. R. 73.
14 The protection accorded to non-cumulative preferred stockholders by
building up a fund for future distribution by implying a credit each year from
earnings if dividends are not declared has been criticized as being too liberal
on the ground that sufficient protection can be given on broad principles of
equity. This is true if the courts take the position of the Indiana Supreme Court
in Star Publishing Co. v. Ball (1922), 192 Ind. 158, 134 N. E. 285, stating that
the court would scan closely a refusal to declare dividends where there are net
profits and where the preferred stock is non-cumulative.
15 Cratty v. Peoria Law Library Assn. (1906), 219 Ill. 516, 76 N. E. 707;
Channon v. Channon Co. (1920), 218 Ill. App. 397; Star Publishing Co. v.
Ball (1922), 192 Ind. 158, 134 N. E. 285; and McLean v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co. (1893), 59 Pa. 112, 28 At. 211.
16 Wood v. Lary (1888), 47 Hun. 550, app. dismissed 124 N. Y. 483, 26 N. E.
338; Burk v. Ottawa Gas & Electric Co. (1912), 87 Kan. 6, 123 Pac. 857, Ann.
Cas. 1917B, 546.
17 Morse v. B. & M. R. R. (1928), 263 Mass. 308, 160 N. E. 894. See Stevens,
Rights of Non-Cumulativze Preferred Stockholders (1935), 34 Col. L. R. 1539.
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able,18 but the court in the principal case appears correct in rejecting such
objection on the ground that the corporation was adequately protected.19 The
court's ruling in the principal case against that part of the decree ordering
payment of dividends in the future in event of profits seems correct. A court
of equity should not compel a declaration of dividends until after the board of
directors has exercised its discretion and an abuse of such discretion has been
shown. W. S. H.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-APPEALS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS.-Plaintiff,
an Indiana corporation organized to engage in the small loan business, sought
to avoid the provisions of an Act of 1933 reducing interest rates and placing
the small loan business under the control of the Department of Financial Institu-
tions.1 The complaint in part charged that the act was invalid because it
made no provision for an appeal to a court for a judicial determination of the
questions involved. Held the validity of an act subjecting businesses of a
certain character to rules and regulations of a non-judicial body does not depend
upon provisions granting or failing to grant an appeal to the courts. Financial
Aid Corporation v. Wallace (Ind. 1939), 23 N. E. (2d) 472.
Generically speaking, due process is not necessarily judicial process, nor is
the right of appeal essential to due process of law.2 The right of appeal is not
an inherent or inalienable right, except where expressly guaranteed by the
State Constitution. 3
The general rule is that appeals are recognized as allowable only from
judicial decisions, and administrative tribunals or departments do not ordinarily
render judicial decisions. 4 A fundamental principle underlying the right of
appeal in all cases is, that in the absence of express statutory provision to the
contrary, the decision appealed from must have been made by a tribunal or
officer vested with judicial authority, and while acting in a judicial capacity.5
It has repeatedly been held that an appeal will not be allowed to the courts
from the purely ministerial or administrative action of a public officer, board,
commission, or similar tribunal, without express statutory authority. 6 The court
held in the principal case that the act conferred administrative, and not judicial,
authority.7
28 Gesell v. Thomahawk Land Co. (1924), 184 Wis. 555, 200 N. W. 550.
19 Stevens v. U. S. Steel Corp. (1905), 68 N. E. Eq. 373, 59 Ati. 905.
1 Chapter 154 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1933, p. 806, amending
Chapter 125 of the Acts of 1917, p. 401, secs. 18-3001 to 18-3005, Burns' Indiana
Statutes 1933; sec. 10465 to sec. 10469, Baldwin's 1934.2 Reetz v. Michigan (1903), 188 U. S. 505, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390.
3 In re Petition to Transfer Appeals (1931), 202 Ind. 365, 174 N. E. 812.
4 Ferner v. State (1898), 151 Ind. 247, 51 N. E. 360.
5 U. S. v. Ferreira (1851), 13 How. 40, 14 L. Ed. 42; Indianapolis v. Hawkins
(1913), 180 Ind. 382, 103 N. E. 10; Board v. Davis (1894), 136 Ind. 503, 22
L. R. A. 515.
OSims v. Monroe Co. (1872), 39 Ind. 40; Farley v. Hamilton Co. (1890),
126 Ind. 468, 26 N. E. 174; Cushman v. Hussey (1917), 187 Ind. 228, 118 N. E.
816; State Board v. Ort (1925), 84 Ind. App. 260, 151 N. E. 31.
7 "An administrative officer charged with the administration of the laws
enacted by the General Assembly necessarily exercises a discretion partaking
of the characteristics of the judicial department of the government, but does
not have the force and effect of a judgment." Financial Aid Corporation v.
Wallace (Ind. 1939), 23 N. E. (2d) 472, 475.
